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Abstract  
Over the past decades, Somalia has experienced civil wars, inter-clan conflicts, militias warlords, terrorism, and 
other several violent conflicts. These conflicts resulted in the deaths of many innocent civilians and destroyed the 
state institutions, structures, and trust in governance and consequently affected the agricultural production of the 
country, which resulted to nationwide famine. Thus, this article aims to critically understand the causes and 
consequences of the conflict in Somalia. It also aims to discuss opportunities and strategies for peacebuilding and 
reconstruction of Somalia. The article reveals that clan and clannism are the leading causes of Somalia’s 
destabilization. Furthermore, the article argues that radical extremism, corruption, the militarization of clan 
members, inequalities and extreme poverty, and massive youth unemployment are the most common factors that 
lead to Somalia's never ending conflict. On the other hand, this article examined that mass migration, extremism, 
the emergence of piracy, and the loss of Somali unity and nationalism are the results of the prolonged conflict. 
Moreover, the article found that the previous peacebuilding approaches such as the promotion of democracy, 
elections, free market-based reforms, and building local institutions combined with modern state standards adopted 
from the international community have failed to promote peace and stability in Somalia. Thus, this article 
recommends that social reconciliation should be held and led by the local people. This in return, we believe will 
help Somalia to restore peace, the rule of law and ensure long term stability.  
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Introduction  
The Somali state established in 1960 was the product of unifying the former British Somaliland which gained its 
independence from Britain on 26th June 1960, and the former U.N. trust territory under Italian administration which 
gained its independence on 1st July 1960, from Italy. Five days later, the two entities voluntarily united to form the 
Somali Republic on 1st July 1960. This unification brought unity followed the adoption of a democratic system of 
government based on parliament democracy, although Somalia lacked the human resources, culture, and 
institutional bases necessary for the success of this system (Lewis, 1980). The democratic system guaranteed 
political parties the freedom to organize and to compete for national elections. Thus, Somalia became a democratic 
country with all citizens having the right to vote and stand as a candidate, freedom of associations was allowed, 
and two parliamentary and presidential elections were held. Moreover, Somalia enjoyed nine years of 
parliamentary democracy, arguably producing the first peaceful democratic transfer of power in Africa. This also 
marks Somalis president Adam Abdulle Osman to became the first African head of state to step down after losing 
national elections and end his seven years in office (Samatar, 2016).   
However, a few years later, the democratic environment and the idea of political parties reflected clan 
loyalties which caused the dream of democracy not to live long. Moreover, self-rule, corruption, poverty, and 
insecurity paralyzed the newly established democratic institutions. Then, the situation became worse when the 
military regime led by Mohamed Siyad Barre overthrew the emerging of civilian government in a bloodless coup 
in 1969. The regime immediately changed the form of governance system from democratic rule to Leninist-Marxist 
style of governance and brought an abrupt end to the process of constitutional democracy. The regime 
administration reflected both ideological and economic dependence on the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, after 
twenty-one years of dictatorial rule and abuse of basic human rights, the military government was violently outset 
from power by various political unions and clan motivated rebel groups in 1991 (Elmi, 2010). Nonetheless, after 
the overthrow of the regime, no alternative authority was available to replace the regime, and the country 
immediately plunged into a state of anarchy and devastation (Abdi, 2012).  
The plunge of the Siyad Barre regime triggered the emergence of civil war, armed groups, inter-clan conflicts, 
warlords, pirate gangs, and Islamist extremists which led to the annihilation of the structure of the government and 
its institutions which also caused the ruin of both human and material resources. Moreover, the conflict produced 
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more than two million people displaced internally, and dozens immigrated to foreign countries (Avis & Herbert, 
2016). Thus, Somalia experienced absence a functioning strong central government since the collapse of the Siyad 
barre regime was ousted in 1991, making it the longest-running instance of complete state collapse in postcolonial 
history (Menkhaus, 2007).  
Various peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts have been made for the last thirty years aimed at ending the 
hostilities and establishing a functional central government. So far there have been more than fifteen peacebuilding 
efforts, including many sponsored United Nations Mission in Somalia.  Regional organizations such as IGAD also 
made several efforts to bring the Somalia conflict to an end through a peaceful process (Mulugeta, 2010). Somali’s 
neighbour countries have also contributed to Somali’s peacebuilding and reconstruction process. The most 
prominent national conference was held at Art, Djibouti in 2000 and 2004 Nairobi, peace conference. None of 
these efforts, however, has reached the desired results (Khayre, 2017). 
Similarly, the international community has made numerous attempts to establish a central government and 
bring back stability to Somalia. For instance, in 1992, the United Nations security council (UNSC) approved a 
unilateral U.N. military intervention to Somalia (Harper, 2012). United Nations operations failed to restore peace 
and stability in Somalia (DiPrizio, 2002). Even though in 2004 a transitional government was established in 
Nairobi. In 2012 Somalia, completed its political transition through a limit and indirect election of a new federal 
parliament and president with the support of the international community. However, peacebuilding efforts have 
been challenged by internal conflict actors, financial challenges, and external actors (Harper, 2012). Therefore, 
this article concentrated on studying the nature of the Somali conflict. The article also seeks to establish the root 
causes and the consequences of the Somali conflict, and analysis strategies and opportunities for peacebuilding 
and reconstruction in Somalia. The next section of the study discusses the background of the conflict in Somalia.   
 
Conflict Background  
Bad governance practices and inequalities between members of various groups in terms of their access to political 
power and resources in the 1980s led to the emergence of armed clan-based movements that forced the Siyad Barre 
regime to flee the country following the collapse of the state in 1991. Since then, Somalia has been in a failed 
situation. Following this, a various grouping of armed factions sought to control the national territory of Somalia; 
thus, the country entered decades of prolonged conflict and civil war (Elmi & Barise, 2006).  
Furthermore, in the absence of authority, the clan-rebel groups that overthrew the Siyad Barre regime 
immediately fought one another to control Somalia. Other armed groups fought for controlling the capital city and 
established government. Ali Mahdi was appointed as interim president by residents in Mogadishu to lead the 
civilian wing of the U.S.C. However, General Aided who played a leading role in the fight against Siyad Barre 
annoyed the nomination of Ali Mahdi as a president. Nevertheless, Aided rejected Ali leadership and claimed he 
is the rightful person to lead Somalia. In 1991 several attempts aimed to reconcile these two rival groups were held 
in Djibouti; however, this attempt was a missed opportunity. Thus, a destructive fight broke out between General 
Aided and his rival Ali Mahdi which claimed the lives of as many as 25,00 innocent civilians and caused the death 
station of material resources (Clark, 1993). Moreover, this destructive battle divided the capital city of Mogadishu 
into two parts: an area controlled by Ali Mahdi, such as north of the city. At the same time, general Aided controlled 
other areas in the south, such as the airport and seaport (Abdi, 2012).  
Amid this confusion, northern Somalia (currently known as Somaliland) declared political independence from 
the rest of Somalia under a government led by Somali National Movement (S.N.M.). Northern Somalia then 
became the self-declared Republic of Somaliland on 18th May 1991. Whereas southern Somalia descended into a 
state of anarchy and fighting involving multiplication of numbers of clan-based warlords and militias as well as 
extremist fighters, which has to this date continued to hamper the re-establishment of the normal functioning of 
the nation-state structure.  
Moreover, the civil war, which started between 1991 and 1992 in the south of the country destroyed the state 
institutions, structures, and trust in governance and consequently the agricultural production of the country which 
resulted in nationwide famine. An estimated 300.000 Somalis died from starvation. To control the problem, the 
international community adopted a resolution called 733; in 1992, this resolution was the first attempt to restore 
peace and stability and to reach people who are in need in Somalia. However, the Warlords disregarded the 
ceasefire and engaged in extensive fighting as well as looted international aid. Thus, this effort has not reached the 
desired result.  Furthermore, Somalia tested ten years without government from (1991-2000), during this period 
many innocent civilians lost their lives because of the power and resource control struggle between the armed 
groups and/or the warlords. Whereas many other civilians lost their lives due to starvation and hunger. A review 
of literature has shown that, Mogadishu battle as one of the most controversial conflicts in half of the twentieth 
century. During this war, a Blackhawk helicopter was shot down by the rebel militia groups (New York Times, 
1993). Likewise, this conflict marked the first time that two U.S. helicopters were shut down over Somali airspace, 
which finally led the U.S. to end its mission to Somalia in 1995 formally.  
In 2000, the Transitional national government was established as Somalia's central government with 
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Abdiqasim S. Hassan elected as the president after nine years of chaos. During his time into the office, his 
administration was able to control just parts of the Mogadishu, with the rest of the country, was under various 
faction leaders. Nevertheless, another attempt of peacebuilding and reconstruction was adopted when a transitional 
federal government was established in 2004 under the presidency of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, with the support of 
the United Nations and the African Union. The transitional government was unable to promote reconciliation and 
set about peacebuilding and state-building strategies and was beset by an internal disagreement which resulted in 
transitional federal institutions to sat Baidoa in Southern Somalia and was incapable of reopening state institutions 
in the capital city of Mogadishu. Therefore, the competition of power and resources among different clans, the 
extremist organization, youth unemployment, and the unlimited foreign interventions made attempts to 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution in Somalia impossible (Elmi & Barise, 2006).  
Islamic Courts Union (U.I.C.) emerged in southern Somalia as a social movement, they have been active from 
2004 to 2008 and had social and political aims reflecting both internal diversity (and division) and new 
international positioning (Abbink et al., 2009). The Islamic Courts movement enjoyed a significant level of support 
from the local people when they restored peace and stability in the countries' capital and their role in hunting down 
the 'War Lords' and Somalia reconstruction. Thus, during its six months in power, the Islamic Court Union 
achieved an unprecedented level of security in Mogadishu (Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, 2007). 
The Islamic Courts were against the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia as their potential rival and 
declared a jihad against it. The severe confrontation between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and 
The Islamic Courts commenced a new phase of the Somali conflict which led Ethiopian militaries with the support 
of the U.S. intervened in Somalia to weaken Islamist militant groups.  
However, the most extreme members within the Islamic Courts called themselves as Al-Shabaab and 
managed to control most of the capital and made the government to seek help from the African Union. Al-Shabaab, 
the Al-Qaida linked group carry out massive explosions, and suicides against the government of Somalia. This 
chaos leads to the arrival of peacekeeping forces from the African Union (AMISOM)1 from the Somali conflict 
and contributed to the justification of extremists to defend their country against foreign interventions. The radical 
extremists added the Somali conflict into another layer, terrorism, which claimed the lives of thousands of innocent 
people and led to the widespread concern of the organization, particularly in light of its connections with the Al-
Qaida and other Jihadists across the world. Thus, African troops mandated by the African Union to support the 
government of Somalia in the fight against the Al-Shabaab have been deployed to Somalia (AMISOM, 2014). 
Today, more than 20.000 African Union peacekeeping Missions are active in Somalia, with the approval of the 
United Nations Security Council. Nonetheless, the effective government was not restored despite many 
peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts organized by local people and the international community in the last 30 
years. Therefore, this article argues that a long-term approach to development, institutional building, and 
diplomatic strategies will promote peace and political reconciliation in Somalia.  
 
Somali Conflict: Actors and Factors 
At this point, understanding the context of the Somali conflict actors is essential to understand the causes and the 
consequences of the conflict. The literature on the different actors of the Somali conflict is extensive. For this 
study, a summary of some of the Somali conflict actors will be discussed. The actors can be grouped into three 
main players and include, external actors, internal actors, and the militant group Al-Shabaab who are currently 
active within Somalia. These groups have different political aims, views, and affiliations.   
External actors are foreign countries and international organizations that are directly or indirectly involved 
in Somalia's conflict. According to  Bowden (2012), Somalia was divided between Italy, Britain, and France, and 
another Somali territory was given to Ethiopia or added to Kenyan territory. Italy who colonized Southern Somalia 
was never in a position to influence events after Somali got its independence. Britain, who also colonized northern 
Somalia currently known as (Somaliland) walked away and never got involved until recently, mainly when Somali 
piracy affected the Britain economy and insurance industries. France never became involved in the Somalia 
conflict but kept its military base in Djibouti. Neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya have been 
Somalia's natural enemies in the last decades. 
The Internal actors include federal member states and their foreign allies who have strategic interests in 
Somalia. Moreover, the current situation in the country confirms that the competition for political power and 
natural resources sharing between the federal government and federal member states was the leading cause of the 
conflict in recent years. However, the civil war that started in Somalia in 1991 was motivated by resources and/or 
political power and clan supremacy.  Additionally, the autonomous region of Somaliland is also a big question for 
the conflict of Somalia to end especially the question of the independence of Somaliland. We argue that the heavily 
armed conflict and the lawlessness of the country motivated by the clan and clannism movements. We also argue 
that the civil war broke out in Somalia and the conflicts between rival clans that destroyed the state institutions 
                                                          
1 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is operated by the African Union as a regional peacekeeping mission with the approval of the 
UN. It was founded on 19th January 2017 at the African Union’s Peace and Security Council with an initial six-month mandate.   
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were motivated by clan and clannism. We, also consider clan organization as the main enemy against Somalia to 
establish a modern state and get back to its position in Africa and the world. 
 
Major Causes of the Somali Conflict 
Clan competition: Somalis are well-known as people who lived with hostilities for ages because of the semi-desert 
geographical location with a scarcity of water and pasture. The reputation of Somalis as fearless defenders of their 
independence, their reliant faith in Allah, their clans, and the regenerative glory of camels has evolved since 
Somalia provided fragrance to the ancient Egyptian pharaohs (Peterson, 2014, p. 7). For centuries nomadic 
pastoralism provided a livelihood to the Somali people in the Horn of Africa, before the colonial partition of the 
Somali `territories’ in the middle of the 19th century, the history of the region had been dominated by the massive 
migration of Somalis into areas inhabited initially by other populations (Ahmed & Green, 1999). The main reason 
for movements lays looking for livelihoods for families as well as pasture and water for their livestock. 
When it comes to the inner lives, Somalis organized and lived as clans that used to have their own rules of 
living. Before the colonials, the Somali people had no central authority with public interests then groups run for 
their attention. Traditional Somali politics was based on two dialectically related principles: kinship and contract 
(tol iyo xeer) (Jama, 2007). Kinship was founded on the segmentary lineage system under which people traced 
their descent to common male ancestors (Jama, 2007). Agnates are used as mutual political groups since blood 
relativeness is the bond. However, for a political system, the blood relative remains sufficient. Agnates worked as 
corporate political groups because they negotiated a social contract that defined the terms of their collective unity 
(Jama, 2007). Since the land of the Somalis is mainly dry and semi-desert, the Somali clans had been confronting 
over the ownership of the necessary resources such as water, livestock, and fertile or grazing land prolonged earlier 
the independence (Elmi & Barise, 2006; Lewis, 1993). Remarkably, like the onions, the clans contain layers that 
go more in-depth to two brothers who conflict on their prioritized interest. According to (Peterson, 2014) who 
noted the hierarchy of priorities from the Somali proverb had this to say: 
“Me and my clan against the world; 
Me and my family against my clan; 
Me and my brother against my family; 
Me against my brother”. 
This culture of pastoralism mixed with the political changes after the arrival of the colonials. During the 
celebrations of independence and born of Somali Republic, many poets mentioned their feelings through poems 
and songs. Among the songs “Aan Maalno Hasheena Maandeeq” (Let us milk our she-camel Maandeeq) written 
by Sahardiid Mohamed and sung by Abdullahi Qarshe was one of the most famous songs (Hassan, 2008). 
Analyzing the song, one can argue that it shows how the Somalis would utilize the new government through the 
personification of the she-camel as the government. Nevertheless, stealing camel using force was one of the 
primary roots of conflict among Somalis. Following the independence of Somalia urbanization commenced; thus, 
the kind of resources and means of obtaining them changed. Political figures assumed that whoever is in power 
would manage the state’s resources. Access to water sources and grazing in the Somali rural areas shifted to 
approaching government institutions, resources, staffing of civil servants and access to foreign aid. According to 
Ali (2016), a Somali journalist Mohamed Urdoh published his investigative report after he observed the Somali 
police force in 1967. He discovered that more than 70% of police station chiefs were associates of the same clans. 
He found out that 51 out of 71 polices chiefs were the same clan.  
Foreign intervention: The Horn of Africa lies one of the strategically most important places in the world and it's 
essential for global maritime checkpoints. The strait lies between the African nations of Eritrea, Somalia, and 
Djibouti, as well as Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula. About 40 per cent of the world’s oil vessels cross the Bab 
el Mandeb, which links the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean via the Red Sea and Suez Canal (Abdinor H. Dahir, 
as cited in Davis et al., 2007, Addow, 2016). Some can say that foreign intervention plays a crucial role in the 
Somali conflict. As far as back to the colonial legacy, Somalis have been under the pressure of foreign countries. 
The European colonizers (Britain, Italy, and France) divided the land of Somalis into five parts. Britain seized two, 
Italy and France each took one. 
To appease the Ethiopian king Menelik who was greedy for land, Britain gave him the Somali region of 
Ogaden. From 1891 to the present, Ethiopia has been expanding to the east (Elmi & Barise, 2006). Somalis settle 
a strategic place in which foreigners have the intention to utilize. The foreigner’s partition of Somalis ignited the 
raise Somali nationalism and the dream of reuniting the greater Somalia, which contains the five Somalis. As soon 
as two Somalis that would later be united and formed the Somali Republic got the independence from Britain and 
Italy was attacked by Ethiopia in 1964. Following that war in 1977, the military regime of Somalia attacked 
Ethiopia to liberate the Somali Ogaden region of Ethiopia.  This war changed and impacted the life of Somalis 
after the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other countries helped Ethiopia and defeated the Somali army. Following the 
defeat of the Somali army in the Ogaden War, some of the foreign countries were funding and arming Somali 
militias against the military government. Lastly, these opposition groups overthrew the military regime after 21 
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years in power.  
Foreigners support and oppose the conflicting parties in Somali politics based on their interests. The 
neighbouring countries play an active role in the Somali conflict; Ethiopia and Kenya are the leading countries. 
Ethiopia’s meddling is the most important and persistent factor in the perpetuation of the Somali conflict (Elmi & 
Barise, 2006). Ethiopian intrusion plays a key role in the lengthy conflict in Somalia. Elmi & Barise (2006), argue 
that Ethiopia was the leading provider of shelter and arms to all plunders, demoralized the two most noteworthy 
peace understandings (Cairo 1997, and Arta 2000). Correspondingly, it had predisposed the Somali peace process 
in Kenya, which its outcomes formed the transitional federal government. For direct intervention, Ethiopia invaded 
several towns in Southern Somalia without the approval of the Somali government and provided weapons to the 
allied groups across the border. In other words, Ethiopia, a powerful and well-positioned state, is a hostile 
neighbour that aims to maintain a weak and divided Somalia (Elmi & Barise, 2006). 
Not only neighbouring countries’ interventions exacerbated the Somali conflict, but the internationalized 
intervention also contributed to the prolonged Somali conflict. Until the late 1980s, the world great powers (the 
United States, and the Soviet Union) used Somalia and its regional neighbours as a play arena for their geopolitical 
rivalry with no concern for the local consequences. The end of the Cold War removed the competitive motive for 
U.S. interventionism, its place being first (in the early nineties) taken by a humanitarian motive, couched in terms 
of the ‘new world order,’ and then after 9/11 by that of counter-terrorism (Møller, 2009). Even though the former 
rationale was altruistic and the latter selfish, the consequences were not all that different, both being profoundly 
counterproductive, and exacerbating, rather than relieving, the plight of the Somali population (Møller, 2009). The 
foreign intervention has been frustrating peace efforts in Somalia and triggers more thorny confrontations. The 
level of forceful military engagement intended for regional domination has profoundly affected the efforts of 
peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia negatively (Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, 2018).  
Radical Extremism: Somalia is a kind of country where culture is almost identical with the religion. The 
Islamization of the Somali peninsula was gradual through assimilation and cultural infusion (A. M. Abdullahi, 
2015, p. 86). As Somalis faithfully practise the Islamic religion, it is easy-going to manipulate to extremism 
ideology. The religious groups had been secretly operating since the military regime. The military brutality caused 
the Islamists to remain less active in politics. Nevertheless, as soon as the military regime collapsed in 1991, the 
radical Islamists armed themselves and joined the conflict. Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI), a neo-Salafist group that 
revealed itself in 1992 in the United Kingdom, joined the conflict and conquered some regions in Somalia to 
implement its aim. The first of its published eight objectives is the establishment of the Islamic State and others 
include the rejection of all Jahili (un-Islamic) polity, the attainment of Islamic justice, the establishment of peace 
in society, a well-planned economy, propagation of Islam, and war against all devious beliefs, Bida (A. Abdullahi, 
1992, p. 114).   
The armed wing of Al-Ittihad Al-Islam (AIAI) faced many clashes against the Somali warlords and Ethiopia 
in the Somali region of Ethiopia in the 1990s. The skirmishes ignited the defeat of Al-Ittihad Al-Islam, and Ethiopia 
invaded Somalia for the first time. This unusual reaction to invading Somalia was the outcome of a series of deadly 
explosions, and assaults occurred in the capital Addis Ababa whose responsibility was claimed by Al-Ittihad 
spokesman in Mogadishu (Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, 2018). The defeat of Al-Ittihad did not pave the way the vanish 
of extremist ideology; instead, it leads to its reshaping. Somalia experienced years of rules under warlords, mainly 
in Southern regions. Similarly, extremists were also running their operations. Somalia attracted international 
terrorists and became a hub for some of the most wanted international terrorists, including those who were accused 
of the explosions of the U.S. embassies in East Africa. 
Massive Corruption: Since 1960 independence, Somalia has been a victim of corruption in government 
institutions. During the so-called democracy years of civil government (1960-1969), corruption grew up along 
with the Somali government and the population disgusted beyond the endurance of corruption and wished a 
political change that would implement reforms. The inappropriateness of the Italian-style parliamentary form of 
government served to foster widespread corruption (Payton, 1980a). According to Payton (1980a), corruption, 
favouritism, and nepotism reached a peak during the first nine years of the Somali republic. The corruption laid 
down the cornerstone of the conflict among the clans. Politicians using Somali clans began competing for the 
public resources for private good.  On the other hand, government officials spent thousands of public funds to 
manipulate the elections for their interests. It was noted, “that the price of Somali politics that between January 
and October 1969, the Office of the Prime Minister reportedly dispensed £500,000 in public funds to members of 
the National Assembly which ‘had been turned into a sordid marketplace where deputies traded their votes for a 
personal reward with scant regard for the interests of their constituents” (Payton, 1980b). The increasing level of 
corruption and maladministration that dominated the 1960-1969 Somali republic was the main reason why the 
army drew widespread popular support (Tripodi, 1999, p. 114). Although the military regime showed intolerance 
to the corruption during the early years of reign, later it only got worsened and widespread. Corruption impacted 
every single institution in the military regime. It paved the way grievances of many clans that opposed the military 
government and prompted the early stages of the Somali conflict. Sheikh Mukhtar, the most senior parliamentarian 
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of the last civilian administration, not without overstating his point labelled Siad Barre for becoming ‘musuq-
maasuq (corruption) (Ingiriis, 2016, p. 131).  
Currently, Somalia remains the top of the most corrupt states on the globe. According to Transparency 
International (2019), Somalia ranked 180/180. Somalia has indicated the most corrupted state in the world and 
scored only 9/100 free from corruption. As one of the most prolonged states collapses in recent decades, Somalia 
experiences significant corruption challenges that are common among conflict-torn countries. Like previous years, 
many of the countries near the bottom of the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index have been severely affected by 
violent conflict in recent years (Transparency International, 2019). Corruption is further worsened by the fragility 
of the central government, limitedness of administrative strength, lack of enough resources, feeble leadership 
structures and an inadequate ability to pay government officials. Major public and private institutions like security 
forces, judiciary, immigration management, land administration, public procurement, and legislation are always 
involved in allegations of corruption. The corruption in public institutions contributes to the sustainability of the 
Somali conflict. For instance, security forces who were supposed to stabilize the country and combat the Al-
Shabaab extremists’ attacks tend to sell their armies to their opponents. 
Moreover, security forces leaders embellish the number of the armies they command to earn the salaries of 
nonexistent armies. Contrarily, the informal sector that the Somali economy relies on, such as livestock trades, 
telecommunications, and remittances fuels to corruption by not paying the required taxes to the government 
probably. The consequences of private sector corruption trigger competition among them, which leads to the 
manipulation of government officials—the flimsiness of government officials to the businessmen fuels the Somali 
conflict into new layers. According to Freedom House, 2012, estimated money of more than $72 million in donor 
fund was corrupted in between 2009 and 2010, whereas, an additional $250 million in incomes were in ambiguity 
transactions. Thus, it is accepted that corruption and conflict are frequent. Consequently, there is an integrative 
relationship between conflict and corruption as corruption feeds on conflicts and vice versa. Generally speaking, 
corruption is an essential cause of conflict, weakening the government and causing grievances and discontent 
(Giorgio Spagnol, 2019).  
The militarization of clan members: The opposition forces that ousted Mohamed Siad Barre had organized 
into clans, and each of them represented the interests of a specific clan. Following the collapse of the military 
government in 1991, clans went back to their origins and prepared themselves to protect their affiliates and attain 
their interests. The resettlement of clans in a specific piece of land draws clan-based borders, and those borders 
cause a conflict between the clans. The main concerns that reason those conflicts, including water and pasture for 
livestock in rural areas. The members of the clan, leading youth, are militarized and funded. The clan militaries 
show loyalty to their clans and ready to die for the name and prestige of the clan. The accessibility of weapons 
facilitates the militarization of clans in Somalia. The military regime mainly focused on defence, built a strong 
army, and compelled the so-called national duty program “Shaqo-Quran.” While preserving his monopoly of arms, 
Siad Barre tried to spread the military ethos through military training courses required for school and college 
graduates as well as civil servants (Adam, 1992). The main aim of the program was the provision of military 
training to Somali citizens to defend the country if needed. It has been noted “that from 1969 onwards the Somali 
military budget continued to absorb an increasing proportion of national revenue; ‘even before the war, Somalia 
was the only country with a per capita income of less than $150 which spent huge sums on armaments and defence’ 
(Samatar, 1988:114)” (Adam, 1992). Consequently, the fall of the military regime, the whole weapons, went to 
the hands of clans, then each clan established its militias. Presently, there are harsh confrontations between the 
clan militias, which claims the lives of hundreds of innocent Somalis. The militarized clan militias extend the 
lifetime of the Somali conflict. 
Political, Economic and Social Inequalities: The political, economic, and social inequalities played a crucial role 
in intensifying the Somali conflict. Some clans gained more political power than others and utilized the scarce 
economic opportunities for their private good. The political, along with economic disparities, resulted in social 
inequality. The Gini index, a measure of inequality, in Somalia was 34 per cent in 2017 (World Bank Group, 2019). 
Layers of Somali inequality triggers grievances and grudges of some people, and their reaction contributed to the 
urgency and sustainability of conflict. 
Nevertheless, the political, economic, and social inequalities are less discussed and ignored to find a solution 
for it. As long as those factors remain, the conflict grows and extends its existence. For countries like Somalia that 
are struggling for stability in all sectors, such as, economic, political, social, and cultural, always have to take into 
account of addressing the inequality that exists among larger groups of people, here, in this case, the clans in 
Somalia (Muse, 2019). Two approaches exist to explain why inequality exists: one is to blame the poor; other is 
to blame society. Some parts of Somali communities were not provided opportunities to improve themselves in 
terms of education, health, and other social services; thus, a massive number of those people mainly youth found 
limited options and armed themselves to play their roles in the conflict.  
Extreme Poverty and High Unemployment: Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world. The World 
Bank Group (2019), published that 69% of Somali people lived in poverty in 2017. Somalia has the sixth-highest 
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poverty rate in the region, only after the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Madagascar, 
Burundi, and South Sudan (World Bank Group, 2019). The extreme poverty is a consequence of high 
unemployment in the country. The population aged 15-64 years comprised just above half (52.3%) of the total 
population (UNFPA, 2014). The population in the workforce, especially youth, hardly finds proper employment. 
The unemployment leaves an idle person a vulnerability to join conflicting parties. Extreme groups and other 
actors of the Somali conflict utilizes the eagerness of vulnerable groups and promises provision of some wages 
and salary.  
 
The Consequences of the Somali Conflict 
Mass Migration: One of the significant consequences of prolonged Somali conflict is that it caused massive 
displacement and migration, forming the fourth biggest refugees globally. Some Somalis migrated before the fall 
of the military regime. However, most of the exiles left the country during the break out of the civil war as refugees. 
This mass migration started in the northern regions (currently Somaliland) in late 1988 and followed by the 
southern provinces in 1991 when the fight against the military regime turned fierce into a civil war. In the 1990s, 
there were 478.3 thousand Somali immigrants worldwide compared to 20.7 thousand in 2005 and 52.1 thousand 
in 2019. In 1990, data exhibits 6.6% of international migrants were Somalis, the number decreased to 0.2% in 
2005 and increased again to 0.3% in 2019 (UN DESA, 2019).  
The Somali migration took several forms, some migrated to Europe, North America, and Arabian countries, 
as well as others, immigrated to neighbouring countries. The Somali migrants faced many challenges in adapting 
and living those new countries, including discrimination, humiliation, and racism (Abdulle, 1999; Fangen, 2006; 
Magan, 2019; Nimo-Ilhan, 2016). Moreover, there are hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled to the neighbouring 
countries, mainly Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and some in Yemen. These refugees have been living in severe 
conditions since today. The accommodation for Somali refugees who fled the civil war, famine and drought ignited 
the establishment of Dadaab refugee in 1991. The camp was constructed in the northeastern Kenyan region. 
However, the Somali refugees outnumbered and overcrowded the camp. Recent data indicate that the current 
population of Dadaab camp (463,422) is more than five times the camp’s recommended initial capacity of 90,000 
people (Kumssa et al., 2014). The Somali refugees face harsh obstacles for obtaining adequate shelter, water, 
education, health that are necessary for living needs.  
Violent Extremism: Extremism is an international issue that has been growing for the last three decades. 
Extremism based on a misinterpretation of religion comes to Somalia as one of the main consequences of the 
Somali conflict. After the collapse of the military regime in 1991, religious motivated and rebel groups emerged 
in Somalia. Since there was no or less effective functional government in Somalia, different religious groups came 
to the political arena. The urgency of radical groups in Somalia publicly waxed in 1991 and the most prominent 
groups among Al Ittihad Al Islami, Al Tabligh, and Al Islah. In 1995, a group called Jihad Al Islam, led by Sheikh 
Abbas bin Omar, emerged in Mogadishu and gave the two main warlords, General Mohammed Farah Aideed and 
Ali Mahdi, an ultimatum to end their factional fighting (Dagne, 2012). The group mentioned their presence in 
several countries, including Sudan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Kenya, as well as having their offices in those countries. 
In 1996 some members of the group formed a club named Sharia (Islamic law) Implementation Club (SIC). SIC’s 
principal objective was to establish Sharia courts throughout the country (Dagne, 2012). According to Dagne 
(2012), vital players in the foundation of these courts were also members of the Transitional National Government 
of Somalia.  
The trends of radical Islamists turned into the current fiercer Al-Shabab, who declared affiliation with Al-
Qaeda in 2012. Most influencing Al-Shabab founders were related to Al-Qaeda pieces of training and visited 
Afghanistan. Besides, foreign radical Islamists made Somalia a hiding place and worked hard to implement their 
political ideologies. In 2003, the leadership of Al-Ittihad, including Sheik Ali Warsame, brother in law of Sheik 
Hassan Aweys and some other top leaders, met and later decided to form a new political front (Dagne, 2012). 
However, the young active members of Al Ittihad, with their independent political motive, declined the proposal 
and agreed to form their group. The young extremists met in Las-anod, and some members of the group shared a 
mutual experience, fighting in Afghanistan. The young extremists founded al Harakat Al-Mujahedeen, recently 
known as Al-Shabaab. The main contributors to the formation of the group including, the dead leader of Al-
Shabaab, Ahmed Abdi Godane, the late Aden Hashi Ayrow, the renegade Mukhtar Robow and Ibrahim Haji Jama. 
The primary objective of this group was irredentism and to establish a “Greater Somalia” under Sharia (Dagne, 
2012). However, Al-Shabaab remained ineffective with no land under their control until 2008.  
The extensive Somali conflict attracted international terrorists and made Somalia a hub for international 
terrorists. Those terrorists, including some of the most wanted terrorists who were accused of bombing U.S. 
embassies in East African countries, Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The suspects operated beside other Somalis 
including Fazul Abdullah (also known as Harun Fazul) from Comoros- who was the mastermind of the 1998 U.S. 
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania,  Sheik Mohamed Abu Faid, Saudi national,  Abu Mansur Al Ameriki, 
American national, Abu Musa Mombasa, Pakistani national, Mohamoud Mujajir, Sudanese national, Abu 
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Suleiman Al-Banadiri, Somali of Yemeni descent (Dagne, 2012; Harun Maruf & Joseph, 2018). The new concern 
of terrorism in Somalia caused the death of thousands of people, mass destruction, and different casualties. The 
terrorists extended their operations to the East African countries, mostly Kenya, in which several terrorist attacks 
were carried out, and this came after the decision of deploying Kenyan forces in Somalia in 2011. Likewise, 
Uganda has most of the AMISOM peacekeeping forces in Somalia. In 2010, Ugandan civilians, watching the final 
World Cup match, were bombed in Kampala.  
In Somalia, where people are suffering most, the Al-Shabaab terrorists carry out attacks indiscriminately 
through car bombs, grenades, shelling/ artillery, abduction, remote explosive, landmine, and attacks. Between 1st 
January 2010 – 4th January 2020, Somalis have been experiencing one of the worst terrorist attacks on the globe. 
In the decade, the number of organized violent events was 10,811, and the reported fatalities were 29,593. Still, 
moreover that, the civilians are also targeted. In the same decade, civilians were targeted in 1752 events, with 3650 
reported fatalities. Al-Shabab also carried out attacks in Kenya, targeting both armies and civilians starting from 
2011 when Kenyan forces entered Somali to fight against Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabab took 416 organized violent 
events in Kenya, which caused 1484 reported fatalities, and they also targeted civilians in 156 times, with 761 
fatalities (ACLED, 2020).  In addition to Al-Qaeda linked Al-Shabaab, there are renegade terrorists that separated 
from Al-Shabaab and declared that they are allied with ISIS international terrorists. The terrorists see Somalia as 
a suitable place for hosting terrorism because of the absence of persuasive central authority besides the availability 
of weapons and much-unemployed youth that can be recruited as fighters. The different terrorist groups clashed 
each other several times.  The conflicts between the terrorist groups are just a symbol that shows there is no unique 
ideology among them but different political ambitions.  
The emergency of Piracy: Piracy has been an existing problem back to hundreds of years and took several stages 
depending on the situations of that moment. Piracy stands as one of the main consequences of the Somali conflict.  
The reason that contributed to the urgency of piracy is an absence of a functional government in Somalia for almost 
decades. Some arguments mention piracy as a reaction of Somali fishers confronting foreigner fishing in Somali 
waters illegally. The root cause of Somali piracy lies in the threat that illegal fishing posed to the livelihoods of 
subsistence and commercial fishers along the coastline (Awet Weldemichael & Hassan, 2012). Whatever the 
causes could be either overfishing of foreigner or the greedy Somali pirates, the fall of the Somali government is 
what mothers all those consequences.  
The piracy adversely impacts international countries as well as Somalis. Since the early 1990s, rampant piracy 
off the coast of Somalia has become a major issue for global trade and security, prompting strong responses from 
the international community (Kellerman, 2011). As back as the 1990s, the urgency of piracy off the Somali coast 
challenged the international trade and security rising reactions from the global communities. In 2010 alone, 
the collective cost of ransom money, military protection, and cargo insurance as a result of piracy is estimated to 
have been between 7 and 12 billion dollars (Kellerman, 2011). Contrarily, Somali communities experienced 
various negative impacts of piracy, primarily the behaviour of the pirates. Pirate presence in coastal villages and 
inland towns tended to be closely followed by a deterioration of security, economic challenges, and the erosion of 
Islamic religious tenets and Somali moral values (Awet Weldemichael & Hassan, 2012). The increase in 
consumption of drugs mainly, khat, alcohol, cigarettes, and other drugs leaked into society, leading in some drunk 
gun-wielding youth firing at random and untrained drivers with luxurious cars with the maximum speed that causes 
serious accidents. Additionally, prostitutions augmented as did failed marriages and broken families. Buying on 
credit, pirates started to pay twice the regular price of goods, leaving ordinary people hard-pressed to sustain their 
lives due to the exorbitantly inflated prices of basic consumer goods (Awet Weldemichael & Hassan, 2012). 
Loss of Somali Unity and Nationalism: Nationalism has been a vital force for the development of a nation. 
However, considering the Somali nationalism which came into existence as resisting force aimed to unite Somalis 
and respond to the colonial powers during the early 20th century. Also, nationalism became more political force 
during the establishment of the Somali state and declined during the beginning of the civil war. The Somali conflict 
has an unenthusiastic correlation with nationalism. The early stages of the conflict started with grievances and 
grudges, leading to a decline in the sense of patriotism. The development of the Somali conflict weakened 
nationalism through times and finally caused the end of the central government. Consequently, other unnecessary 
loyalties, tribalism, and extremism took the role of nationalism.  
The main centrifugal forces in Somali society revolve around clans – essentially genealogies that trace descent 
from common male ancestors (tolnimo) (Solomon, 2014). Tribalism, the main contributor to the Somali conflict, 
shows intense rivalry to the nationalism. Thus, the shared Somali nationalism is weakened by state-based 
nationalism rooted in the clan-based federal states. Thus, the conflict shapes the tribalism, which plays the role of 
nationalism and develops each clan in uniting among them and defending their interests instead of national interest. 
Religious nationalism, the result of radical extremist interpretations, managed to unite people of different clans, 
races and even nationalities in Somalia. The radical groups created a convincing alternative to the Somali 
nationalism and shifted to extreme Islamic nationalism. There are indications that Al Shabaab is picking up the 
mantle of al-Ghazi and Hassan and attempting to merge patriotism (specifically the dream of ‘Greater Somalia’) 
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with a radical Islam (Solomon, 2014). This group is against the government in Somalia and regard it as infidels 
against the Islamic culture and promised to fight against it. Thus, signs of nationalism are life-threatening redlines 
in the eyes of this group. The Somali government, meanwhile, is referred to as kooxda ridada (the apostate group), 
and the derogatory name Al Shabaab gives to the Mogadishu government is Daba Dhilif (meaning a government 
set up for a foreign purpose) (Solomon, 2014).  
 
Strategies for Inclusive Peace-building  
Peace-building has developed tremendously in the last three decades and has grown over time to assume different 
meanings from different organizations and policy practitioners in different contexts. However, the term 
'peacebuilding' came into widespread use after 1992 when the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros announced an 
'agenda for peace' since then, peacebuilding has come to be understood as an essential concept reflecting a long-
term approach to peace, security, and development. In Somalia for instance, the last 20 years, the international 
community has been supporting Somalia to recover from civil war and violent conflict, yet, these efforts have not 
produced the desired results since the peacebuilding approach was a top-down process. A review of literature has 
shown that most peacebuilding approaches for Somalia have been focusing on one top-down approach, such as 
the promotion of democracy, elections, free marked based reforms and building local institutions allied with 
modern state standards adopted by the international community. Thus, this approach has failed to promote peace 
and stability in Somalia.  Therefore, to address Somalia's prolonged conflict and to carry forward positive outcomes 
of previous peacebuilding efforts. We suggest the following strategies to be adopted.  
Social reconciliation: Over the past years, Somalia has experienced civil wars, enter-clan conflicts, warlords, the 
rise of extremism and radicalization, and a devastating famine – leading to a loss of the state institutions, social 
cohesion, and unity among the Somali people. Thus, there is an urgent need that the government of Somalia and 
its federal member states undertake a deep-rooted process of social reconciliation across the country from the 
village level to the city, and from the regional level to the national level. So, it is equally essential that the 
reconciliation process to held in Somalia, leading by local people in terms of both leadership and financially. 
Furthermore, we recommend that an independent national institution to be established to facilitate and organize 
the process of the national reconciliation process.  
Traditional peacebuilding techniques: We consider the traditional peacebuilding approach as an important way 
of resolving the Somalia conflict. This approach focuses on issues of human dignity, human rights promotion, and 
respect for each other (Abiodum, 2000; Mabovula, 2011; Swidler, 1992). Moreover, this traditional peacebuilding 
approach involves norms, ideas, dialogues, and other African traditional methods developed by African traditional 
societies (Bamidele, 2014).  Thus, Somalis traditional elders need to be given space in conflict resolution and the 
state-building process in Somalia. It also promotes the ownership of peacebuilding efforts, which can connect 
people to a collective identity such as "peace".  We, therefore, recommend that traditional leaders be given a formal 
role in the peacebuilding process. Nonetheless, we believe the traditional peacebuilding approach as a tool for 
peacebuilding can help the bottom-up peacebuilding approach to stand more successful. Somaliland and Puntland 
are good examples of how this approach could work in Somalia. In Somaliland, for instance, traditional elders 
managed to bring people together to establish a society with a common interest and build peace from the ground. 
Furthermore, the traditional elders successfully implemented a social reconciliation followed the establishment of 
a framework for peaceful coexistence between the different clans living in Somaliland. Among the achievement 
of the conferences in Burao and Borama with the leadership of the traditional elders, Somaliland created a 
presidential system of government compromising two houses: a clan elders house and an elected house of the 
representative. Thus, Somalialdn established a relatively strong local community structures that had been 
successful since the days of British rule. (Leweis, 2002) Nevertheless, traditional elders played a similar but lesser 
role in Puntland, where clan negotiations took place under the dominance of a single, Ethiopian-supported warlord 
(Leonard & Samantar, 2011). However, the understanding of those clan leaders produced a peaceful coexistence 
and stability in the Puntland regions.  Considering, the twenty-first century events one can agree how difficult is 
for an external actor to involve in conflicts and look for a resolution. The collective power of international actors 
seems a tempting alternative, but it is naïve to assume that the various national and multinational interests of the 
actors who would be involved are all either consistent with one another or congenial to a domestically viable state-
building project (Leonard & Samantar, 2011). Therefore, we consider if the traditional peacebuilding approach is 
well implemented will ensure continuity of peacebuilding efforts from the local level as well as promote collective 
integrity and social responsibility of the people. 
Governance and institutional building: We consider the problem of governance as one the core and fundamental 
source of Somalis political instability.  The Somalis political elite do not agree on how and who is going to govern 
the country and all the tensions and problems of governance undermined Somalis willing to build a good 
governance environment. Furthermore, the absence of political institutions and poor good governance practices in 
Somalia is considered to be one of the significant challenges facing the Somalis peacebuilding and reconstruction 
process.  Governance, according to Viteritti (2009) refers to an institutional arrangement that assigns power to the 
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public institutions and officials to define the mechanisms by which the society can hold them an accountable and 
transparent way. Governance further involves the mechanisms, processes, and institutions that citizens, groups, 
and societies utilize in joint decision-making and implementations in expressing their interest and in fulfilling their 
obligations as well as solving their differences. Governance leads to the nature of mutual interaction among social 
actors like, civil society organization, the society, political parties as well as bureaucracy, and the state, which 
simply meant "joint government". A governance system that society believes and strong institutions is what 
Somalia has lacked for the last 30 years. According to Elmi & Barise (2006), abuse of power is one of the main 
and core causes of the Somali conflict. Therefore, creating a good governance environment and building strong 
institutions that can regulate the exercise of power is crucial for building peace in Somalia (Hared, 2018).  
Inclusivity for peacebuilding and sustaining peace: The term inclusion is of increasing importance as it is 
used by the states, regional and international organizations to promote peace. Inclusion is also crucial for creating 
an environment where all citizens can equally be able to contribute efforts to sustain peace and development, with 
an emphasis on including those who may be marginalized within the society. Additionally, the Inclusive 
peacebuilding processes are a key and fundamental way of ending violent conflict. Therefore, in the order 
peacebuilding process in Somalia to be effective, the process must be inclusive and participatory. Furthermore, to 
sustain the peacebuilding process, it is crucial that no one is left behind, and no one should be subject to any form 
of exclusionary rhetoric.  
 
Conclusion  
The main theme of this article was to examine the major causes and consequences of the Somali conflict. The 
article also assessed strategies to peacebuilding and Somalia reconstruction. Accordingly, the article found that 
the ongoing conflict in Somalia has interrelated causes that include instrumentalization of clan identities, power 
struggle, corruption, militarization of clan militia, political, economic and social inequalities, and extreme poverty 
and high unemployment. Moreover, the article analyzed the consequences of the conflict in Somalia and found 
that mass migration, loss of Somali unity and nationalism, violent extremism, and emergency of piracy are the 
outcomes of the conflict. Nonetheless, the conflict in Somalia is not limited to the country rather have regional 
consequences including, political, economic and humanitarian consequences. In the final section of this article, we 
proposed inclusive peacebuilding strategies that we believe would help Somalia to get back its position in Africa 
and the search for peace and long-term stability.  
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